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Abstract 
The ideal Bayesian agent reasons from a global 
probability model, but real agents are restricted to 
simplified models which they know to be 
adequate only in restricted circumstances. Very 
little formal theory has been developed to help 
fallibly rational agents manage the process of 
constructing and revising small world models. 
The goal of this paper is to present a theoretical 
framework for analyzing model management 
approaches. For a probability forecasting 
problem, a search process over small world 
models is analyzed as an approximation to a 
larger-world model which the agent cannot 
explicitly enumerate or compute. Conditions are 
given under which the sequence of small-world 
models converges to the larger-world 
probabilities. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
This paper is concerned with the use of decision theory as 
a framework for analyzing the behavior of an intelligent 
autonomous agent. It is generally agreed that our best 
exemplars of intelligent autonomous agency--human 
beings--are not Bayesians. It is also generally agreed that 
many systematic departures from the Bayesian norm can 
be explained as heuristics which people use to cope with 
computational constraints. Given that any agent we can 
build will have limited computational capacity, what role 
should decision theory play for the enterprise of 
developing intelligent autonomous agents? 
Bayesian decision theory justifies many qualitative 
features of generally accepted "good" reasoning, and 
explains many qualitative features of "bad" reasoning (see, 
�.g., Pearl, 1?88; Howsen and Urbach, 1989). The theory 
IS often apphed in cases in which the idealized axioms are 
clearly unrealistic. But successful decision analysis 
usually requires a highly trained (human) decision analyst 
working with the decision maker to construct a model of 
the problem. Similarly, decision theoretic computer 
systems either are hand-crafted for constrained, well­
understood domains, or use heuristic methods at the meta 
level to construct an object-level decision theoretic model 
(e.g., Andreassen, et al., 1987; Goldman and Charniak, 
1990). 
It has been argued that the latter is the appropriate role for 
decision theory (Wellman and Heckerman, 1987). A 
heuristic meta-level reasoner constructs decision theoretic 
models for "small worlds," or restricted sets of 
propositions and actions. Decision theory enforces 
consistency on beliefs and action recommendations 
produced by the "small-world" models. The meta-level 
reasoner is free to use the output of a small world model, 
modify it, or change the model, depending on the 
situation. But this approach begs two important 
questions. First, if formal justifications of decision 
theory assume "grand world" coherence, what justifies 
decision theory on the small world? Second, what theory 
underlies the meta-reasoner? 
This paper is part of a research effort to develop a decision 
theoretically based foundation for the meta-reasoner. My 
basic formulation can be summarized as follows. The 
meta-reasoner controls a search process over a space of 
small world models. This search process is viewed as an 
approximation to a (computationally infeasible) decision 
theoretic model on some larger world. I assume that the 
agent would prefer the larger world model, if it could be 
computed, to the feasible small world approximation. 
Within this formal framework, search processes over 
small worlds can be analyzed to determine how well they 
perform as approximations to the larger world model. 
Note that I do not assert that the larger world model 
represents the agent's "true" grand-world beliefs--indeed, I 
do not even assume that the agent has grand-world beliefs. 
In this paper, I restrict attention to the common and 
important class of problems in which an agent forecasts 
probabilities of a sequence of events. These events may 
be repeated events of the same kind, as when an agent 
assesses probabilities for different diseases given patients' 
observed symptoms. Alternatively, the events may be of 
different kinds, as when a common sense reasoner makes 
predictions about events it expects in its current situation. 
In either case, I assume the agent receives feedback about 
whether the forecast events actually occur. The agent can 
search a countably infinite space of probability models, 
but has access to only two models (the current model and 
a comparison model) at any given time. Under given 
conditions on the agent's search process, I derive results 
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about convergence of the agent's model to the larger world 
probabilities. 
2 THE SEQUENTIAL FORECASTING 
PROBLEM 
Consider an agent attempting to forecast the probabilities 
of a sequence E1, E2, ... of arbitrary events occurring 
sequentially in time.1 The events can be defined in 
advance or defmed dynamically on the basis of information 
observed at times prior to time t. 
The agent's task is to state a probability Pt for Et. This 
forecast may take into account the agent's entire 
experience up to, but not including, the events which 
occur at time period t. Formally, let �t be a 0'-field 
representing all events known to the agent at times up to 
and including time period t. The agent's knowledge 
increases monotonically with time--that is, -% c Jii c ... 
The condition that the forecast must make use only of 
information known before time t is formally expressed by 
requiring that the agent's forecast Pt be an Jft.-1 measurable 
function. Thus, 
Pt == P(E1 IJ4_1) , where-% c Jil c... (1) 
expressing dependence of the agent's probability estimate 
for Et on the past history Jft.-1 of observations. 
Denote the indicator function of Et by Xt: 
(2) 
The expression P (X1 I 1ft-1) is !!Sed to denote 
P (E 1 I .1f1_1) when Xt = 1 and P(E1 I 9-ft-1) when 
X1=0. 
3 MODEL SEARCH AND REVISION 
3.1 ASYMPTOTIC BEHAVIOR OF THE 
MIXTURE MODEL 
Consider a set of models indexed by a parameter ro e n. 
Each model represents a recipe for computing forecasts 
P ro<Et I Jft.-1) at each time period from information known 
to the agent prior to that time. The set n can represent 
either a space of implicitly defmed models which a single 
agent can enumerate, or a population of agents, each of 
whom has a recipe for predicting E1. This paper considers 
the probability forecasts of a single agent who has access 
to the models in 0., either because she is the agent 
enumerating and computing the implicitly defined models, 
or because she can ask the other agents in the population 
for their forecasts. However, the agent is assumed to have 
finite resources for computing or communicating, and 
cannot access all the models at once. 
1The exposition is limited to binary events, but the results remain valid 
for events with an arbitrary finite number of outcomes (as when 
forecasting probabilities of different diseases). 
For this paper, I assume that the parameter space 0 is 
finite. The issues involved in extending to the countable 
case are discussed briefly. This assumption is not so 
restrictive as it may seem, if the ro are thought of as 
indexing different model structures, whose parameters can 
be estimated given data. The parameter space for any 
given Pro may be uncountable. For example, ro might 
index a model in which the probability of Et depends on a 
set of "symptoms" (Y 1 t .. .. Y n) observable prior to time 
t, where the unknown probabilities n(Y lt . . . .  , Y r0 are 
estimated from the data, and could have any values 
between 0 and 1. There is no requirement that the models 
be explicitly Bayesian; Pro can be any recipe for 
computing a degree of belief in E1 given information 
available prior to time t. 
The set n comprises all the models the agent is able to 
consider. For the present, let us assume that the agent 
believes 0 to be adequate. That is, the agent's larger­
world model is a probability mixture over the Pro. An 
agent would assign a probability mixture over the Pro if 
she believed one of the models to be correct, and expressed 
her uncertainty about which one was correct as a 
probability distribution over n. Note, however, that an 
agent might be willing to assign a mixture distribution 
over the n without believing in the literal truth of any of 
the P00• Note also that the agent may not be able to 
compute this mixture distribution--but she believes that if 
she could compute it, the mixture would provide accurate 
probability forecasts. 
Let the agent's prior probability for the model ro be 
denoted by aro0 > 0, where L. awo = 1. Define 
P (},,<xt I .94-t>a(J).t-1 
:Ll ro'(Xt I .94-l)aw',t-1 (3) 
(lj 
The quantity (3) is the agent's posterior probability for 
model ro given the data Xt. X2 . .. . , Xt. The agent's 
probability for event E1 given all information available 
prior to time t is then given by: 
(4) 
(J) 
Adopt for the moment the position of an agent who 
believes that one of the models is correct, although she 
does not know which one. Call this unknown correct 
model Pro*· The following lemma shows that the agent 
believes that the mixture distribution will eventually 
arrive at probabilities which agree with those of the 
unknown correct model Pro*· 
Lemma 1: With probability 1 under the distribution Pro*. 
the posterior probability a001 of model Pro converges to a 
limiting value a00 as t � oo . If the limiting posterior 
probability is greater than zero, then 
Pw(Xt IJ\_t) � 1  
Pw.<Xt IJ\_t) 
(5) 
Corollary 2: With probability 1 under Pro•. P(Xt 194-t) 
- Pro>�<(Xt I 94-t) � 0 as t � oo. 
Corollary 2 states that if the data are produced by some 
unknown "true" probability distribution, then Bayesian 
updating of a mixture distribution which assigns nonzero 
probability to the correct model will eventually result in 
forecasts agreeing with the true probabilities.2 
3. 2 SEARCH AND REVISION - NO 
FORGETTING 
Suppose that (4) describes the agent's beliefs about the Xt. 
In other words, the agent's beliefs can be represented as a 
mixture over the models Pro. However, the agent cannot 
compute the full mixture distribution, and thus the agent 
does not "know" her larger-world beliefs at any point in 
time. 
In this section, I analyze the behavior of a heuristic model 
search and revision process, referred to as SR. Informally, 
the SR process can be described as follows. At each time 
period, the agent makes a prediction given her current 
model (one of the Pro). and at the same time (i.e., based 
on the same information) selects an alternate model 
according to a model search distribution. She then 
compares the relative posterior probabilities of the current 
and alternate models. If the posterior probability of her 
current model is higher than that of the alternate model, 
she retains the current model; otherwise, she replaces it 
with the alternate model. 
Formally, let OOct and OOat denote the current and alternate 
models at time period t. Let IJ.t(OO) denote the probability 
at time t of selecting model ro as the new alternate model. 
The initial models IDeO and ro aO may be chosen 
arbitrarily. The model search distribution J.1.1(ro) is a real­
valued .!Hi:-1-measurable function such that IJ.t(ro) > 0 for 
all roE Q and L IJ.1(ro) "' 1. (The neasurability condition 
means that the probability of selecting model ro depends 
only on 91'i:-1· that is, on infonnation known to the agent 
prior to time t.) For each t > 0, COat is assumed to be 
selected independently of X1 according to the probability 
distribution P[roat=OO I !1f1_t] = Jlt(ro). Now, suppose 
that the agent updates her model by selecting for the next 
period's current model the model with the higher posterior 
probability given all information observed so far. That is, 
suppose that A-rot denotes the likelihood of the observed 
data under the model indexed by ro (an explicit fonnula is 
given as Equation (A-1) in the appendix below). Then the 
agent selects her current model at time t according to: 
2Proofs are given in the Appendix. The proofs of Lemma 1 and 
Corollary 2 carry through for countable n as well. 
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if aw oA.w t c,t-1 c.t-1 
roa.t-l otherwise . 
(6) 
It is assumed that OOct. OOat E 2ft. That is, the agent's 
knowledge at the time of forecasting includes knowledge 
of which model is being used for forecasting and which is 
the alternate model. This assumption allows the model 
search probabilities IJ.t to depend on the previous search 
path as well as on other information known to the agent 
prior to time t Apart from .?ft-1-measurability and the 
condition of Theorem 3 below, no restrictions are placed 
on the model search distribution llt· Analyzing the 
behavior (especially short-term behavior) of SR under 
different types of model search distribution is an 
interesting research problem, but beyond the scope of the 
present paper. 
The agent's forecast at time t is given by 
Note that (6) uses relative posterior probabilities, so that 
the agent need not compute the normalizing factor in the 
denominator of (3) (computing this would require her to 
know Arot for all ro, which I have assumed is infeasible). 
Nevertheless, the agent does need to compute Aco t. the 
likelihood under the new model of the entire past seq�ence 
of data (the reasonableness of this assumption is discussed 
in greater detail below). 
The SR process makes no claim to optimality, nor is it 
intended as a faithful psychological account of how people 
reason. It is put forward as a simple procedure which 
plausibly accounts for important qualitative features of 
human scientific reasoning, such as belief persistence 
(adherence to the current hypothesis despite disconfirming 
evidence) and sudden "paradigm shifts" (which will occur 
when the search process visits a model more probable than 
the current one). 
Suppose, for example, that if ro is near ro' (by some 
appropriate proximity measure), the probability 
distributions Pro and Pro• are similar. Suppose also that 
the model search distribution places high probability on 
OOat near the current model OOct· (This corresponds to the 
heuristic judgment that if a model fits well, similar 
models can be expected to fit better than alternate models 
chosen at random.) Most modifications to the agent's 
current theory, then, are likely to be relatively minor. If 
the current theory is not correct, however, occasional 
"anomalies" can be expected. That is, events an incorrect 
theory considers improbable might be expected to occur 
more often than the theory predicts. Eventually, a distant 
model may be generated that has higher posterior 
probability than the current model. This will be the case 
if the new model explains anomalies in the current model, 
approximates the current model on the things the current 
model predicts well, and does not have too low a prior 
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probability relative to the current model. (Note that ad 
hoc hypotheses constructed specifically to fit the 
anomalies will fail to be accepted because they have low 
prior probabilities.) When a better model is found, SR 
replaces roct with the new model roat• and a paradigm 
shift occurs. The search process now begins searching for 
models near the new model. Because it is unlikely that 
the best model in that new neighborhood was enumerated 
initially, there ensues a period in which the new model is 
incrementally refined by searching its neighborhood for 
improved models. Thus, SR with an appropriately defmed 
model search process can produce behavior which mimics 
qualitatively the process of scientific inference put 
forward by Thomas Kuhn (1962).3 
The following results compare the asymptotic behavior of 
SR with that of the mixture distribution. For Theorem 3, 
again assume that the agent believes one of the models, 
denoted by Pro• is correct 
Theorem 3: Suppose that (l) at visits each (l) E n 
infinitely often. Then under Pro•, 
p(l) (Xt I �-1) �t � 1 0 (8) 
p (l).,(Xt I �-1) 
with probability 1 as t � oo • 
Corollary 4 drops the reference to an unknown correct 
distribution. 
Corollary 4: Under the mixture distribution, the 
probability that 
I P00 (X1 I !J4_1)- P(Xt I J4_1) I> e (9) ct 
converges to zero for each e > 0. 
Corollary 4 states that under the mixture distribution, the 
difference between the forecast of roct and the forecast of 
the mixture distribution converges in probability to zero. 
This means that the probability that this difference exceeds 
in absolute value any fixed nonzero constant becomes 
arbitrarily small as t approaches infmity. In other words, 
with more observations it becomes increasingly probable 
that the current model's forecast will be very close to the 
mixture model's forecast 
The SR procedure is intended to model an agent restricted 
in her ability to represent and compute her entire mixture 
distribution. But it is deficient in one important respect 
as a plausible model for a bounded agent. Each time the 
agent enumerates a new model she must compute the 
likelihood of the entire sequence of previously observed 
data under the new model. This means that the agent 
must not only remember the entire past sequence of data 
3The term paradigm shift is usually resetved for major belief shifts, 
typified by the replacement of Newton's theory by the theory of 
relativity. The formal framework presented here applies whether Ol 
indexes grand theories of the universe or simple time series models of 
stock market prices. Although one might balk at using the tenn 
paradigm shift in the latter context, it is interesting to note that the same 
formal framework applies to belief changes at a variety of levels. 
points Xt. but must also remember all past values of any 
auxiliary variables Y 11, Y 2t. . .. that might be required to 
compute any of the Pro. Finally, to compute /.00 t she 
must compute and multiply together the values �(Xs I 
.1l8.t) for all s < t. The feasibility of this is quite 
doubtful. It may be feasible for the agent to use a 
heuristic approximation of A.roat; Of course: th� results of this section apply only when tne correct bkehhoods are 
used. 
The SR procedure is feasible as a model of information 
exchange among rational agents. For suppose that the set 
n indexes a large population of different agents. Each 
agent w has his own model Pro. After each trial, each 
agent computes his own model's likelihood /.001 for the 
data. (This is simply the product of A.w,t-1 and the 
probability forecast for the event which actually occurred 
at period t.) The SR agent begins by selecting one of the 
agents Wet as an advisor. On each trial, she interviews an 
alternate advisor roat• and replaces her current advisor if 
she believes it is more probable that the interviewee will 
provide correct predictions than that the current advisor 
will. Theorem 1 says that such a sequential selection 
process will yield asymptotically correct forecasts if one 
of the agent's models is asymptotically correct and each 
agent is interviewed infinitely often. 
SR possesses the important property that it will 
eventually track correctly any process which one of the 
models in the search space can track. This is true 
assuming only that each model is visited infinitely often. 
In particular, the probability that the correct model w* is 
visited on any trial can be very small, and can even 
decrease with t (as long as it does not decrease so rapidly 
that ro • is not visited infinitely often). 
But real forecasters cannot wait until infinity. Of more 
importance to them is the shorter-term performance of 
SR. This will depend on the properties of the model 
enumeration process llt• of which I have said nothing but 
that it visits each model infinitely often. For good short­
term forecasts, the forecaster requires good diagnostics for 
suggesting new models to enumerate based on 
performance of the current model (cf., Laskey, 1991). 
3.3 RELAXING THE MEMORY 
REQUIREMENT 
Usually when entertaining a new theory one does not have 
available all the data which went into the computation of 
the current theory's likelihood function. If one moves 
from the population of forecasters interpretation to one in 
which a single forecaster enumerates models sequentially, 
the memory requirement of Section 3.2 becomes 
untenable. This section considers relaxation of the 
memory assumption. 
To do this, I define a search strategy which can be 
followed by a memory limited agent. This strategy will 
be called SRF (for search and revise with forgetting). 
SRF works like SR in that the agent makes predictions 
on the basis of a current model while searching a space of 
alternate models. Again, the current model and the 
alternate model are compared on the basis of relative 
posterior probabilities, and the more probable model is 
retained. The differences between SRF and SR are: 
Posterior probabilities are computed on the 
basis of data observed after the alternate model 
has been enumerated; and 
Alternate models are retained for an observation 
period while performance statistics are being 
collected (unlike SR, in which a new alternate 
model was generated each time period). 
The agent applying SRF need only remember the 
information required to compare the current model and the 
alternate model; information necessary to evaluate other 
models will be required only when those models are 
enumerated. 
If the agent is permitted to forget data, additional 
conditions are needed to determine the asymptotic behavior 
of SRF under the mixture distribution. Specifically, we 
need to know that the nature of the process is not 
changing with time: that the models which fit well now 
are likely to be the ones which fit well in the past. If this 
condition is not met, then SRF will be too likely (relative 
to SR) to accept models which fit poorly in the past but 
now fit well. This could cause SRF to be fooled into 
dropping the correct model in favor of one that 
temporarily predicts well, but will begin predicting poorly 
at some future time. 4 
I now specialize to a particular structure for the 
distribution of the Xt. Let Bit, ... , Bqt be a set of 
random variables observed by the agent before she 
observes Xt. and A 1 t. ... , Art a set of random variables 
observed by the agent after she observes Xt. The Bkt and 
Akt are assumed to have only finitely many possible 
values. Suppose that under each P(J). the random vectors 
St :::: (Bit, ... , Bqt• Xt. Att, ... , Art> 
are exchangeable.5 That is, the sequence S1. Sz, .. . can 
be modeled as a set of independently and identically 
distributed random vectors with a common unknown 
probability distribution. The set .0. indexes a finite 
number of different model structures For example, the 
different w might specify different independence 
relationships among the variables comprising St. Each 
Pw would include both a model structure and a procedure 
for estimating model probabilities given past data. 
The SRF strategy compares models over a trial period of 
length k. The agent begins the nth trial period with a 
current model Wen and an alternate model Wan (the initial 
4If t he environment is changing slowly, the correct model is not in the 
search space, n contains models which predict well in the short term, 
and the search process is likely to find a good short-term predictor 
when the current one begins to fail, then SRF may perform better than 
SR. Analyzing the non-stationary case would be an interesting 
extension to the present paper. 
5The sequence S1, S2, ... is said to be exchangeable if the� have the 
same joint probability distribution when arbitrarily reordered. 
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values Wet and Wal m� be chosen arbitrarily). She 
observes data over the n trial period, which consist of 
the variables Snk-k+l• ... , Snk. The agent then computes 
the likelihood under each of the two models of the data 
observed during the nth trial period: 
:A.wn = P(J)(Xnk-k+l I .?I().Bnk-k+l) (11) 
· P(J)(Xnk-k+2 I .?I().Snk-k+l·Bnk-k+2) 
... Pro(Xnk 1.9fo,Sn-k+l• .. ·•Snk-l·Bnk) 
for w = men• Wan. At the end of the nth trial period, the 
agent selects the current and alternate models for the n+ 1st 
trial period. The current model is replaced by the alternate 
model if the product of its nth period likelihood and its 
prior probability is higher than that of the current model: 
(l)cn if a(J) o'Aro n � <lw o'Aro n en en an an 
Wan otherwise . 
(12) 
The next alternate model Wa,n+ 1 is selected according 
to a probability distribution J.L(W I Qn), where Qn 
represents all the information available to the agent during 
the nth trial period: 
On = (Snk-k+ t.Snk-k+2•· · .• Snk.Wcn.Wan) · (13) 
While the agent compares models based only on data 
collected since the alternate model was enumerated,6 the 
agent's forecast is based on all data observed since the 
current model was enumerated: 
Pt = Procm(Xt I.?I(),Smk-k+t .... ,St-t.BJ (14) 
where Wen was ftrst enumerated as the alternate model on 
trial m of the model selection process, was adopted after 
the observation period, and has been the current model 
since. 
If the St are independent and identically distributed, then 
the random sequence � is a Markov chain with fixed 
transition probabilities. If J.l(W l On) is positive for all 
w and none of the Pro assigns zero probabilities, then any 
state can be reached from any other state. Under these 
conditions, the chain possesses a stationary distribution 
(see, e.g., Billingsley, 1979). That is, if the process is 
permitted to evolve for a long period of time, the 
frequency with which it occupies state q approaches a 
limiting probability 1tq. Thus, the SRF process does not 
converge to the correct probabilities. From any state 
(including states in which the current model has high 
6Restricting the agent to current period data greatly simplifies the 
mathematics. Again, no claim is made to optimality or fidelity to how 
real agents reason. 
7The assumption I made was that the St were exchangeable. This 
means they have the same distribution as an independent and 
identically distributed sequence with unknown probability distribution. 
Under exchangeability, Qn has the same distribution as a Markov chain 
with unknown transition probabilities. Thus, distributional results for 
Markov chains apply. 
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posterior probability relative to the other models) it is 
possible to reach any other state (including states in which 
the current model has very low posterior probability). 
At equilibrium, transitions out of a state must balance 
transitions into the state. Let C denote the set of states 
for which the limiting JX>Sterior probability is greater than 
zero (these must all be asymptotically correct models), and 
D denote the set of states for which the limiting posterior 
probability is equal to zero (if there are any asymptotically 
incorrect models, D must be nonempty by Lemma 1). 
Let Pst denote the probability of transition from state s to 
state t. Then 
seC seC tGD uD 
(15) 
Increasing the length k of the trial period decreases the 
spread of the posterior probabilities about their limiting 
values. This decreases the probability of transition out of 
C and increases the probability of transition out of D. 
The effect of this is to increase the equilibrium 
probabilities of states in C. But increasing the sample 
size also increases the amount of time the system stays 
with each model, and therefore slows down the time it 
takes to move away from an initial poor-fitting model. 
This suggests the possibility of beginning SRF with a 
short trial period and gradually increasing the trial period 
as time goes on.8 
In summary, the SRF model was analyzed on a restricted 
class of problems--those in which the probability of Et 
could be modeled as a time-invariant but unknown 
function of a finite set of auxiliary variables with finite 
sample spaces. It was shown that SRF with a fixed trial 
period does not converge to mixture model probabilities 
under the mixture model, but that increasing the length of 
the trial period decreases the probability of states in which 
the current model probabilities are far from the mixture 
probabilities. 
4 . INCORRECT MODELS 
The foregoing discussion assumed that the mixture model 
was adequate. That is, the agent's larger world 
probabilities are the same as a model in which there is an 
unknown correct model in the agent's search space, and the 
agent believes that the mixture model probabilities will 
eventually match empirical frequencies arbitrarily closely. 
This section considers what can be said about the search 
processes defmed above when the agent takes seriously the 
proposition that none of the models is asymptotically 
correct 
The behavior of a mixture distribution when none of the 
models is correct depends on the limiting behavior of the 
model likelihoods under the correct distribution. If Tit(XLJ 
8It should be possible to prove that a suitably chosen schedule for 
lengthening the trial period implies convergence in probability, but that 
is a matter for another paper. 
is the actual probability of Xt. then it may be reasonable 
to assume that a version of the law of large numbers 
holds, and that under II, 
UT = � i log P 00(X1 I !/4) (16) 
i=l 
approaches a limit as T � oo. This will occur, for 
example, in the exchangeable variables model assumed in 
Section 3.3 (assuming that none of the models assigns 
zero probabilities). 
The average log-likelihood UT is a quantity often used to 
evaluate probability forecasts. Suppose a forecaster 
assesses probabilities over a set of events, and when the 
observation is made receives a score log(p), where p is the 
probability assigned to the event that actually occurred. 
The value Ut is the agent's average score under this 
logarithmic scoring rule. The logarithmic scoring rule is 
an example of a proper scoring rule: that is, the expected 
score is maximized by assigning the correct probability 
distribution. 
Note that if two models have equal prior probabilities, SR 
selects the model for which the past logarithmic score is 
highest. As T approaches infinity, the effect of the prior 
wears off; in the limit, SR settles on the model with the 
highest logarithmic score. A future paper will consider 
the performance of SR under different scoring rules, and 
considers a modified SR that converges to the model 
whose asymptotic score is highest under scoring rules 
other than logarithmic. 
A APPENDIX: PROOFS OF RESULTS 
The proofs of Lemma 1 and Corollary 1 do not depend on 
finiteness of n. 
Proof of Lemma 1: Let 
Arot = Pro(Xt I Jio) Pro(X21.:Hi) · · ·  Pro(Xt 11fi-1) 
be the likelihood of the observed data under the model 
indexed by ro. Consider the sequence of random variables 
R (ro ro*) = /..� (A-1) t ' , II.CJl*t 
defined by ratios of likelihoods of the data under Pro and 
Pro•, respectively. This likelihood ratio satisfies the 
equation E[Rt(ro,ro*) I .?ft-11 = Rt-t(ro,ro*), where the 
expectation is taken under the distribution Pro*. A 
sequence with this property is called a martingale. 
Because the martingale (5) is always nonnegative, the 
martingale convergence theorem applies (cf., Billingsley, 
1979). Therefore, there exists a limiting random variable 
R(ro,ro*) such that R1(ro,ro*) � R(ro,ro*) with 
probability 1 under Pro•· 
The random variable 
R1(ro*) = L o:OlOR1(ro,ro*) 
me n 
(A-2) 
is also a nonnegative martingale, and therefore also 
converges to a limiting variable R(ro*). Note that Rt(ro*) 
� a00•oR t(ro* ,ro*) :;::; aro•o. so that Rt(ro*) is bounded 
away from zero. The posterior probability of model ro is 
given by 
Clrot = 
aro0R1(ro,ro*) 
R1(ro*) 
(A-3) 
This ratio converges to a limit a00 equal to the quotient of 
the limits of numerator and denominator. From (A-1) it 
is clear that Rt( ro,ro*) converges to a nonzero limit, and 
therefore that nro > 0, only if (5) holds. 
Proof of Corollary 2: 
I P(X 1 I 14-1)- P ro•(X1 114_1) I 
::;; L aro, I P oo<x, 1.?4-t)- P ro•<xt 1.?4-t) I· 
OOEil 
The quantities I Pro(Xt I Jf1.r)- Pro•(Xt I Jf1.r) I are 
bounded above by 1, and Clrot converges to zero unless 
(A-4) holds. But (A-4) implies that I Pro(Xt I .?ft-1)­
Pro•(Xt I .?il-l) I� 0. Therefore, each term in the sum 
converges to zero, which implies that the sum converges 
to zero. 
Proof of Theorem 3: The proof of Lemma 1 established 
that Clrot � a00 with probability 1. Select the index ro1 
so that aro1 �aro for all roe .n. 
Note that if all Clro are equal to aro1 then (5) holds for all 
ro (by Lemma 1) and the theorem holds. Therefore, we 
need only consider the case in which some a00 is strictly 
less than aro1• Select ffi2 as index of the next largest a00 
not equal to the first: a002 = max ( a00 : roe .n and a00 * aro1). 
Let q�(aro1 - Cl ro2). For each ro there is an index T ro 
such that I a001 - a00 I < q if t > T 00• Let T = max {T 00) • 
Then for t > T, I llrot - a00 I < q for all ro e .n. This 
implies that 
Clrol t - Clrot > Clrol - Clro - 2q > Clro2 - Clro . 
This latter quantity is nonnegative unless a00 = a001• 
Thus, once an ro for which Clro = aro1 is visited on a trial 
greater than T, it will remain the case that Clro = a00 on 
all future trials. That is, IDct will remain at roc1for which 
the limiting posterior probability is strictly positive. 
These are values for which (5) holds. Hence, (8) holds. 
The foregoing argument is valid for each realization for 
which the Clrot all converge, and Lemma 1 established that 
such realizations occur with probability 1 under Pro•. 
Proof of Corollary 4: Suppose the agent believes that the 
Xt actually arise from one of the distributions Pro*· By 
Theorem 3, the agent believes that (8) holds, which 
implies that I ProctCXt l1fi_l) - Pro•(Xt l.'}{t-1) I� 0 with 
probability 1. By Theorem 2, I P(X1 l.?ft-I) - Pro•(Xt I 
.?it-t) I � 0 with probability 1. Therefore, I Pro (Xt I 14-c• 
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I) - P(X1 I .?fr-1) I � 0, with probability 1. But 
probability 1 convergence implies convergence in 
distribution, which is (9). But if (9) holds for any process 
distributed according to the mixture distribution P, it 
holds for all such distributions. 
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